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Abstract 
 
The article is devoted to the analysis of sanctions 
policy in relation to the leading economies of the 
countries of the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU). We note the main risks and threats to the 
national economies of the countries of this union 
in the context of challenges in the sphere of 
economic policy. The application of possible 
protective collective measures by the EAEU 
countries in response to sanctions is assessed. 
There is an important role of the EAEU in the 
development of national economies, in the 
convergence of economies and management 
systems of the members. 
 
Keywords: EAEU, economy, Eurasian space, 
globalization, Kazakhstan, national interests, 
post-Soviet states, protectionism, protective 
measures, regional integration, Russia, sanctions. 
 
 
  Аннотация 
 
Статья посвящена анализу санкционной 
политики в отношении ведущих экономик 
стран Евразийского Экономического Союза. 
Отмечаются основные риски и угрозы 
национальным экономикам стран ЕАЭС в 
контексте вызовов в сфере экономической 
политики. Оцениваются применение 
возможных защитных коллективных мер 
странами ЕАЭС в ответ на санкции. 
Установлена важная роль ЕАЭС в развитии 
национальных экономик, в конвергенции 
экономик и систем управления стран-
участниц. 
 
Ключевые слова: глобализация, ЕАЭС, 
евразийское пространство, защитные меры, 
Казахстан, национальные интересы, 
постсоветское пространство, протекционизм, 
региональная интеграция, Россия, санкции, 
экономика. 
Resumen 
 
El presente artículo está dedicado al análisis de la política de sanciones en relación con las economías de 
los países de la Unión Económica Euroasiática (UEE). El documento señala los principales riesgos y 
amenazas existentes para los sistemas económicos de dichos Estados en el contexto de los desafíos en el 
ámbito de la política económica. En el artículo se evalúa la aplicación de posibles medidas colectivas de 
protección por los países de la UEE en respuesta a las sanciones. Asimismo, el artículo establece el 
importante papel de la UEE en el desarrollo de las economías nacionales, en la convergencia de las 
economías y en los sistemas de gestión de los Estados miembros. 
 
Palabras clave: Economía, espacio euroasiático, espacio postsoviético, globalización, integración 
regional, intereses nacionales, Kazajistán, medidas de protección, proteccionismo, Rusia, sanciones, Unión 
Económica Euroasiática. 
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Introduction 
 
The integration of the post-Soviet states can be 
attributed to the processes of complex 
transformation of national economies and 
management systems, especially of the member 
states of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), and ideally aims to intensify inter-
state relations. 
 
Integration in the post-Soviet states is the most 
effective way to ensure social and economic 
progress in a highly competitive global 
environment. However, in the post-Soviet 
period, there was a gradual drift of weakening the 
interdependence of all countries-participants of 
the CIS, the differentiation of global and regional 
economic and political orientations. If the 
economic interdependence of the union republics 
reached 97% at the end of the 1980s, then a 
quarter of a century later the interdependence 
between all CIS members was 15%. In addition, 
over the past decade, each of the CIS countries, 
except Belarus, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, had more 
export and import relations with CIS non-state 
actors than within the CIS. Another example, in 
the late 2000s, trade between the European 
Union (EU) and CIS countries is 2/3 higher than 
trade within the CIS. The volume of trade with 
Russia in many countries of the Commonwealth 
is about 30%, and Russia with the CIS countries 
only 15% of its total trade (Shishkov, 2001). 
Integration should create new forms of 
governance that coexist with traditional forms of 
state institutions at the national level. This is a 
multidimensional process that, along with 
economic cooperation, includes issues of 
politics, security, social and cultural interaction. 
At the heart of most of the existing integration 
schemes in the modern world are the trade union 
and the interdependence of economic complexes, 
which in the long-term lead to a deep 
convergence of economies and management 
structures of sovereign states. 
 
There is a significant number of researches on 
Eurasian integration issues. Among them there 
are the general works representing the study of 
theoretical, methodological and applied aspects 
(Bogaturov, Kosolapov, Khrustalev, 2002), 
which made a significant contribution to the 
theory of integration based on the study of 
foreign experience, showed the objective nature 
of the integration processes, a significant role of 
the state in the formation and regulation of 
integration processes in modern conditions. 
Foreign studies are presented in the works of F. 
Starr, M. B. Olcott, Zhao Huasheng, A. Cohen, J. 
Mankoff, H. Kramer, other authors who studied 
the development of geopolitical processes in 
Eurasia, put forward ideas of negative and 
positive integration, classification and 
justification of forms of international integration. 
A separate group of Russian researchers focuses 
on conceptual approaches to the study of bilateral 
and multilateral relations in the post-Soviet states 
(Luzyanin, 2007). 
 
A number of research institutions and analytical 
centers located in Russia are engaged in the study 
of the problems of integration processes in 
Central Asia. Among them there are centers and 
institutes in the universities (Peoples' Friendship 
University of Russia, Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations, Diplomatic Academy of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation, Russian State University for the 
Humanities, Institute of Asian and African 
Countries at Lomonosov Moscow State 
University) and also Russian Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Russian International Affairs 
Council, one of the departments of near abroad 
countries of Faculty of History of Lomonosov 
Moscow State University, department of post-
Soviet countries of Russian State University for 
the Humanities, Center for geopolitical studies 
"Berlek-Edinstvo", Center for integration studies 
of Eurasian Development Bank, Institute of CIS 
countries, institutions in the Russian Academy of 
Sciences (Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences, Institute of Oriental Studies, 
Institute of Scientific Information for Social 
Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences). 
Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under 
the President of Kazakhstan, Institute of Central 
Asian and Caucasian Studies (Sweden), Institute 
of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus 
(Azerbaijan), Johns Hopkins University (USA), 
Center for strategic and international studies 
(USA), private intelligence and analytical center 
"Stratfor" (USA) and Institute for security 
studies of the European Union (France) make a 
significant contribution to the study of this topic. 
 
Theoretical basis 
 
Recently, sanctions measures have become an 
active tool in the modern world politics. 
Sanctions, embargoes and all kinds of restrictions 
are used by developed countries with economic 
and technological superiority to achieve their 
foreign policy goals. Sanctions are often used as 
a tool to compete for markets or to gain non-
market advantages, and are used under various 
pretexts in the domestic economic interests of 
their initiators. 
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The leader among the countries-initiators of the 
sanctions were the United States (US): 109 of 
174 instances of sanctions in the XX – beginning 
of XXI are from the US. Financial and economic 
superiority makes it possible to put pressure on 
weaker players, seeking concessions on foreign 
and domestic policy. As a part of the practice of 
politicization of trade and economic contacts, the 
US is pursuing a policy of “linkages”, which 
determine the dependence of the level of 
financial and economic cooperation with 
domestic and foreign policy actions of various 
states. This factor, which is the basis in the global 
foreign policy strategy of the US, stems from the 
messianic and pragmatic foundations of 
American foreign policy, is completely contrary 
to international law, violates the fundamental 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations on 
equality and sovereignty of all countries on the 
world stage. 
 
Among the member states of the EAEU the 
sanctions are applied against Russia and Belarus. 
Thus, in relation to Belarus, the United States is 
conducting the so-called “policy of selective 
interaction”, in fact aimed at the foreign policy 
isolation of Belarus, the restriction of trade and 
economic relations of the country with the states 
of the Western community. Despite the certain 
dynamics of this policy, which has a “pendulum” 
character, the general trend at the beginning of 
the XXI century was a gradual increase in 
political, economic and diplomatic pressure 
against the Belarusian ruling elite. About 85% of 
the total economic potential of the EAEU falls on 
the Russian Federation and the West's anti-
Russian sanctions can significantly affect the 
overall dynamics of the economic activity of the 
union, the foreign trade and investment activities 
of the member states in relations with each other. 
 
Experts are closely monitoring the sanctions 
relations between Russia and the West, studying 
the possible consequences of sanctions on 
Russia's allies and partners, including within the 
EAEU. The current state of the economies of the 
EAEU member states indicates the passage of the 
peak crisis point of the economic cycle, due to 
the improvement of the global macroeconomic 
situation, positive dynamics in the world energy 
markets (Starr, Frederick, 2005). 
 
Currently, the EAEU countries demonstrate 
positive growth dynamics. If since 2012 there has 
been a decrease in a number of key socio-
economic indicators of the US, then in 2018, 
according to the experts, positive trends in 
economic development have been formed, which 
increases the stability of the EAEU countries to 
external influences. The main factor of 
improvement was the steady increase in world oil 
prices, which had a positive impact on the 
replenishment of the budgets of the two largest 
energy economies of the EAEU: Russia and 
Kazakhstan. 
 
The indicators of foreign and mutual trade of the 
US are improving. Thus, the total volume of 
foreign trade of the EAEU countries with other 
states in January – November 2018 amounted to 
684 billion dollars, exceeding the indicators of 
the same period in 2017 by 20.5% or 116.4 
billion dollars. At the same time, the total exports 
of the EAEU countries grew significantly faster 
(by 29% to 445 billion dollars) than imports (by 
7.7% to 239.2 billion dollars). The positive 
balance of foreign trade in goods increased from 
123.4 billion dollars in January – November 
2017 to 205.6 billion dollars in January – 
November 2018 (statistical data of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission, 2019). 
 
The volume of mutual trade of the EAEU in 
January – November 2018 amounted to 54.6 
billion dollars, an increase of 10.3% compared to 
the corresponding period of 2017. These growth 
indicators indicate a slight impact of Western 
sanctions on the economies of the EAEU 
countries. 
 
Table 1. Export and import of goods in mutual trade of the EAEU (millions of US dollars, according to 
the Eurasian Economic Commission) 
 
Countries Turnover Export Import Balance 
January – November 2017, % 
Turnover Export Import 
Armenia 
Belarus 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Russia 
1 938,0 
33 525,2 
17 084,6 
2 089,9 
52 920,6 
626,6 
12 696,3 
5 257,9 
500,1 
35 541,0 
1 311,4 
20 828,9 
11 826,7 
1 589,8 
17 379,6 
-684,8 
-8 132,6 
-6 568,8 
-1 089,7 
18 161,4 
115,1 
111,5 
106,2 
95,2 
110,4 
120,5 
101,7 
110,0 
99,5 
113,8 
112,7 
118,4 
104,6 
93,9 
104,0 
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In this table we can see that the only one and the 
largest one beneficiary of trade within the EAEU 
is the Russian Federation, which has a foreign 
trade surplus of 18.1 billion dollars from trade 
between the states of the union, while the rest of 
the member states are experiencing a deficit with 
the trade with Russia (Olcott, 1996). 
 
Sanctions against Russia 
 
The formation of the EAEU took place in a 
difficult period of geopolitical turbulence, in the 
conditions of unwinding against the Russian 
Federation of personal and sectoral sanctions of 
the US, Europe, etc. According to agency named 
Bloomberg, the sanctions led to a loss of 6% of 
national GDP between 2014 and 2018. 
 
Western countries were limited to regular 
automatic extension of previously imposed 
sanctions packages. The Russian government 
¨responded¨ with an immediate measure against 
the countries, stating the full adaptation of the 
national economy to Western sanctions and the 
insignificant effect of external restrictions on its 
development. 
 
At the initial stage ("pre-Trump" period 2014 – 
2016) the following measures were applied: 
 
• Restriction of entry of politicians and 
officials; 
• Confiscation of property of diplomatic 
missions and expulsion of diplomats; 
• Freezing of various political and 
diplomatic mechanisms and cessation 
of dialogue (e.g. through the NATO-
Russia Council, Council of Europe); 
• Formation of the image of the enemy in 
the national media; 
• Discrediting political institutions, 
political parties and specific politicians; 
 
• Interference in electoral processes, 
support of certain political forces, 
parties, candidates; 
• Escalation of tensions in the field of 
human rights; organization of the «color 
revolutions». 
 
The second stage (2017 – 2018) was the use of 
"smart sanctions" by the West against Russia, 
which were formalized through the signing by 
the President of the US, D. Trump, on August, 2 
2017. The law "On combating the enemies of 
America by sanctions" ("Countering America's 
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act", 
CAATSA), including: 
 
• Economic restrictions against specific 
corporations, enterprises, banks, 
financiers and businessmen (especially 
close to the Kremlin and personally to 
the president, V. Putin); 
• Freezing or seizure of their accounts; 
• Limiting access to long - term Western 
loans for the Russian government, 
national companies and the private 
sector; 
• Limited supply of high-tech equipment 
(turbines, engines, engineering and 
drilling equipment for the oil and gas 
industry) and dual-use products in 
Russia; 
• Squeezing the competitors with energy 
and raw materials markets;  
• Threats to disconnect Russia from the 
system of interbank settlements 
SWIFT; 
• Sanctions against specific regions of the 
Russian Federation (for example, 
against the Crimea). 
 
On January 29, 2018, as part of the execution of 
CAATSA, the US Department of the Treasury 
published the first "Kremlin report". It a list of 
persons close to the president, V. Putin. The open 
part of the report included 114 major officials 
and heads of state-owned companies, as well as 
96 businessmen, whose property exceeds 1 
billion dollars. 
 
On April 6, 2018, the US Department of the 
Treasury announced a new package of anti-
Russian sanctions. 24 people, 12 companies, as 
well as the state-owned intermediary company 
for export/import of products, technologies and 
services of military and dual-use 
"Rosoboronexport", as well as its Bank "Russian 
Financial Corporation" were included in the 
sanctions list (SDN List). 
 
On August 24, 2018, new sanctions against 
Russia (arraignment "Skripali") were published 
in the US federal register, which came into force 
on August, 27 of the same year. 
 
All of the above measures involve damage to 
subjects close to the federal authorities of the 
Russian Federation, and not to the civilian 
population. Sanctions have a wide range of 
effects and objectives. This includes military 
deterrence, counteraction to the strategic nuclear 
missile program, accusations of terrorism 
("Skripali"), attempts to influence the domestic 
political agenda, pressure to change the foreign 
policy course, attempts to solve specific crisis 
situations like Syria. 
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It is no coincidence that the most painful recent 
restrictive measures ¨ hit¨ the Russian economy in 
sectors where Russia is a competitor to the US in 
the global market: military-industrial complex, 
development of new oil and gas fields and 
construction of trunk pipelines, metallurgy 
(Zhao, 2005). 
 
At the same time, the US does not talk about the 
application of sanctions against the EAEU as an 
international organization, although there are 
formal reasons for this (participation of legal 
entities from the EAEU states in trade operations 
with Russian companies under sanctions, 
purchase of weapons and military equipment in 
the Russian Federation). 
 
The experience of Belarus 
 
American sanctions against Belarus began in 
2004 for a number of Belarusian enterprises, as 
well as in 2006 against state officials and 
president, A. Lukashenko. In 2007, restrictive 
measures began against the large concern 
¨Belneftekhim. Further, in the list of the US 
Department of the Treasury eight enterprises of 
the Republic of Belarus related to the group were 
included. 
 
In 2008, Minsk and Washington are mutually 
recalled its ambassador due to the imposition of 
sanctions. The parties have reduced to a 
minimum the staff of embassies, which currently 
continue to work under the leadership of the 
temporary attorneys (Cohen, 2000). 
 
In October 2015, the US Department of the 
Treasury has suspended sanctions against the 
"Belneftekhim" concern and eight of its affiliated 
enterprises in the petrochemical industry. It was 
about the prohibition on visiting the US, the 
presence of accounts in American banks, the 
termination of business by American companies. 
In June 2017, sanctions against some Belarusian 
officials were extended by president, D. Trump. 
 
Belarus also suffered from the EU sanctions after 
the presidential elections of 2010. Most of them 
the EU has suspended in October 2015. At the 
meeting of the EU Council in February 2016, the 
EU foreign ministers considered the issue of 
exclusion from the black list 170 representatives 
of power structures of Belarus, including 
Lukashenko, and a number of companies. 
However, some of the sanctions were retained. It 
was a kind of compromise. 
 
Nevertheless, pressure on Minsk from the EU 
remains: the EU Council condemns the use of the 
death penalty in Belarus and calls on Minsk to 
impose a moratorium on its use. Brussels 
reiterates its call for the restoration of the rights 
of former political prisoners, freedom of 
assembly and association, including the 
registration of political and civil associations. In 
addition, Minsk is urged to involve civil society 
in the discussion of the policy of the authorities. 
 
Impact of sanctions on Kazakhstan 
 
Unlike its partners in the EAEU, Kazakhstan is 
not under Western sanctions. However, the 
continuation of the confrontation between Russia 
and the West may have serious negative political 
and economic consequences for Kazakhstan. 
This impact will be indirect: through failures in 
the banking and financial systems, lending, 
problems of sales of Russian (including Kazakh) 
oil and gas to the EU, a prohibition on the 
purchase of Russian weapons systems. 
 
For example, from the American sanctions 
imposed on the head of the Russian company 
"RUSAL", O. Deripaska, the city-forming 
enterprise in the city of Pavlodar suffered. 
Pavlodar aluminum plant produces 1.5 million 
tons of alumina, of which million tons are sent to 
the Russian concern. Because of the sanctions 
«RUSAL» refused to buy such a volume in 
Kazakhstan. 
 
Another example is when US sanctions have had 
a negative impact on cooperation between 
Kazakh and Russian companies. So, due to the 
fact that the Russian company "Uralvagonzavod" 
was under sanctions in October 2017, 
Kazakhstan's largest producer of sulfuric acid of 
LLP "Kazzinc" has finished all commercial 
relations with him, in particular, the use of 
specialized rail tank of its production. As a result, 
"Kazzinc" has a deficit of 100 tanks, which they 
could not cover. The way out of the situation is 
the use of tanks of Chinese production. Thus, the 
existing industrial relations between Kazakhstan 
and Russian industrial enterprises are disrupted. 
 
These examples have a negative impact on 
economic integration, lead to a decrease in the 
intensity of cooperation relations within the 
EAEU, which is reflected in specific indicators 
of trade, employment, tax revenues. 
 
In the case of a direct confrontation with 
Kazakhstan due to its allied obligations to Russia 
on a bilateral and multilateral basis (Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), EAEU), 
the West is able to deeply undermine the stable 
development of the country. Thus, the strategic 
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goal of the West remains the same: the 
withdrawal of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and 
other Eurasian countries from the sphere of 
Russian influence. 
 
Sanctions against Russia indirectly affect the 
dynamics of Kazakhstan's GDP through trade, 
financial and investment channels. Thus, experts 
of the Center for Analytical Research and 
Forecasting of the Institute of Economic 
Research of the Ministry of National Economy of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan to assess the impact 
of sanctions on the growth of Kazakhstan's 
economy have built an econometric equation 
between the growth rate of GDP of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan and GDP of the Russian 
Federation, oil prices (seasonally-smoothed) and 
oil production volumes based on quarterly data 
for 2005-2016. In general, the totality of these 
factors affects about 70% of the annual GDP 
growth of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
 
According to these calculations, if the real GDP 
growth of the Russian Federation changes by 1%, 
the real GDP growth of Kazakhstan will change 
by 0.5%. Changes in the growth rate of oil prices 
and oil production lead to a change in GDP 
growth by 0.1 and 0.13%, respectively. 
 
Thus, if we consider that for the period 2014 – 
2015 cumulative losses in the growth rate of 
Russian GDP from sanctions amounted to 1.5–
2.0 percentage points, it can be assumed that the 
shortfall in GDP growth in Kazakhstan could be 
0.75 – 1.0 percentage points (Alpysbaeva, 
Kenzhebulat, Akmoldina, Beisengazin, 
Tautenov, 2018). 
 
The sharp fall in the ruble exchange rate in 2014 
caused the inflow of Russian imports to 
Kazakhstan and increased competition in certain 
sectors of the non-resource sector, with a strong 
reduction in raw materials (a 2.5-fold reduction 
in imports of mineral products from Russia). At 
the same time, there was a significant reduction 
in Kazakhstan's exports to Russia by machines, 
equipment and vehicles (2 times), with the 
growth of imports of this category of goods in 
Kazakhstan. If you consider that Russia 
consumes nearly ¼ of all non-primary exports of 
Kazakhstan, the continuation of this trend led to 
a decrease in the competitiveness of producers in 
non-primary sector of Kazakhstan (in the table 
there are the figures of trade show an annual 
deficit of Kazakhstan in trade with Russia at the 
level of 6 billion dollars (about 90% of all mutual 
trade between Kazakhstan and the EAEU 
countries falls on the Russian Federation)) 
(Mankoff, 2013). 
In this regard, experts make the following 
conclusions: 
 
• Depreciation of the Russian ruble in 
2014 caused a "mirror" shift in the 
structure of mutual trade between 
Russia and Kazakhstan and 
strengthened the "raw status" of 
Kazakhstan in the EAEU; 
• Kazakhstan increased the volume of 
raw materials exports and reduced the 
volume of investment exports (exports 
of machinery, equipment and vehicles 
in Russia decreased by 2 times); 
• Russia, on the contrary, increased its 
investment exports and reduced its raw 
materials exports to the Republic of 
Kazakhstan (a 2.5-fold reduction in 
imports of mineral products from the 
Russian Federation); 
• Weakening of the Russian ruble led to a 
reduction in Kazakhstan's production of 
non-primary goods and capital outflow 
to Russia; 
• On the other hand, Kazakhstan's 
consumers of investment and consumer 
goods have benefited from the 
weakening of the Russian ruble in 
conditions of low localization; 
• Level of gold and foreign exchange 
reserves of the National Bank of 
Kazakhstan, in the conditions of low oil 
prices and cheap ruble pressure, was 
supported mainly by operational 
instruments of providing currency 
swaps to market participants and 
transfers from the National Fund of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. 
 
In the context of the functioning of the EAEU, it 
became obvious that the further depreciation of 
the ruble, with the unchanged policy of the 
National Bank of Kazakhstan, reduced the 
competitiveness of Kazakh producers. To 
improve the competitiveness and protect the 
interests of Kazakhstan's producers in the context 
of the functioning of the EAEU, it was necessary 
to provide a more flexible exchange rate of 
Kazakhstani tenge with a gradual transition to the 
policy of inflation targeting. 
 
Collective protective measures of the EAEU 
 
In addition to overcoming the negative factors of 
purely economic influence, the EAEU is looking 
for ways to counter Western sanctions by 
adopting collective legislative measures to 
protect its markets. In this regard, the Eurasian 
Economic Commission in 2018 developed a 
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Report "On the application of collective 
measures to protect economic interests in 
response to the action of a third party in 
international practice and possible 
recommendations to the member states of the 
EAEU, taking into account their current 
legislation and the legal framework of the 
EAEU". The report was proposed to the EEC for 
consideration by all member states in pursuance 
of the order of the Eurasian Intergovernmental 
Council (EIC) № 14 on July 27, 2018. 
 
The Report notes that on the basis of article 40 of 
the contract on the Eurasian Economic Union of 
May 29, 2014, in accordance with the 
international contract of the EAEU with a third 
party and (or) member states of the EAEU with 
third parties provides for the possibility of 
retaliation. Decisions on the introduction of 
retaliatory measures in the customs territory of 
the EAEU are taken by the EEC, including by 
raising the level of import customs duties, 
introducing quantitative restrictions, temporarily 
suspending the granting of preferences or taking 
other measures within the competence of the 
Commission that affect the results of foreign 
trade with the relevant state. 
 
Also, according to the paragraph 2 of the article 
40 of the contract about the EAEU, in cases 
provided for by international contracts of the 
member states with third parties concluded 
before January 1, 2015, the member states have 
the right to unilaterally apply as retaliatory 
measures increased compared to the Common 
customs tariff of the EAEU (CCT EAEU) rates 
of import customs duties, as well as unilaterally 
suspend the provision of tariff preferences, 
provided that the mechanisms for the 
administration of such retaliatory measures do 
not violate the provisions of the contract about 
the EAEU. 
 
The Report analyzes the national legislation of 
the member states of the union with regard to the 
application of protective measures (counter-
sanctions). It has been established that all 
member states, with the exception of the 
Republic of Armenia, have legislation allowing 
them to take various state-level responses in 
cases where third parties take measures that 
violate the legitimate interests of the member 
states concerned or their citizens and legal 
entities, including in cases of violation by third 
parties of their obligations under international 
contracts. 
 
In addition, it is proposed to develop additions to 
the "institutional part" of the contract about the 
EAEU on the coordination of the policy of the 
member states of the union in terms of economic 
security of the EAEU, the single market of the 
union. Such provisions, according to ECE, could 
cover the need for joint and concerted action in 
the field of economy and foreign policy in order 
to achieve the relevant objectives. 
 
The establishment of the Council of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs (CMI) of the member states in 
the structure of the EAEU bodies with the 
involvement of Ministers of foreign trade 
regulation, as well as the Chairman of the EEC 
Board, is also initiated. It is expected that the 
Council of foreign Ministers of EAEU will 
coordinate foreign policy actions and develop 
appropriate proposals for consideration by the 
Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. 
 
Such measures by the EEC experts are justified 
by the need for "clearer and deeper coordination 
of positions on collective measures and 
minimizing the negative effect for the EAEU in 
the context of trade wars, sanctions and counter-
sanctions actions". Without coordination in the 
political plane, in their opinion, the solution of 
trade and economic problems considering the 
current world situation is very difficult (The ECE 
report, 2018). 
 
Thus, the Eurasian Commission implicitly 
recognizes the inevitability of politicization of 
the EAEU, which, in turn, is fraught with 
aggravation of new risks and challenges for the 
member states of the union. Aware of such risks, 
the EAEU member states express fears that in the 
context of growing geopolitical tensions and 
trade protectionism in the world, the initiatives 
proposed by the EEC may lead to the formation 
of a bloc approach, involving member states in a 
sanction’s confrontation with Western countries 
and ultimately to the deterioration of bilateral 
relations between member states and external 
partners. For example, the total volume of 
investments of the US, Canada, EU, Australia 
and Norway (i.e. countries participating in anti-
Russian sanctions) in the economies of the 
EAEU members (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, 
Kyrgyzstan) increased by more than a third in 
2012-2017 (Chichkin, 2018). 
 
Effectiveness and impact of sanctions 
 
According to Russian experts, US actions are a 
sign of unfair competition. US uses its 
dominance in the international financial system, 
the system of international settlements and the 
specifics of its legal system, where 
"extraterritoriality" is at the forefront, to put 
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pressure on business in any part of the world – 
against China, EU, Russia, Iran in order to gain 
advantages in an unfair way. 
 
In the long term, the main problem with the new 
sanctions package is that it dramatically 
increases uncertainty without formalizing 
specific measures, and ensures that the risk of 
expanding sanctions will persist for a long time. 
A direct consequence will be the degradation of 
financial opportunities for Russian companies, 
the rise in infrastructure costs and the increase in 
interest rates needed to maintain capital inflows, 
which are painful for industry and the public. It 
is obvious that the US has unleashed a long 
economic war against Russia and this will lead to 
further tightening of sanctions under various 
pretexts. 
 
Such negative consequences can affect the 
dynamics of economic cooperation of the EAEU 
countries, because Russia, which has the greatest 
financial and technological potential in the union, 
will have to divert additional resources to 
overcome external pressure. 
 
Finally, the effectiveness of sanctions is also 
questionable. It should be noted that sanctions 
are often formulated in a vague way to 
discourage economic activity in a particular 
country. For example, the US prohibition on 
"significant transactions" with the Russian 
military and intelligence sector, in which there is 
no definition of "significance". The threat of 
"secondary sanctions" contributes to uncertainty 
in the US. In fact, if the Russian partner of a 
company is under sanctions, it is necessary to 
interrupt all contacts with him, otherwise the US 
government uses restrictive instruments against 
this company (sanctions against the Chinese 
arms buyer are the first case of secondary 
sanctions related to the Russian Federation). 
 
Estimates of the impact of sanctions on the 
Russian economy differ significantly. For 
example, the former deputy assistant secretary of 
state, P. Harrell, noted that politicians cannot 
systematically assess the "benefits and costs of 
sanctions". In his opinion, the sanctions were 
aimed, among other things, at reducing the 
production of Russian oil, but in 2017 it reached 
a "30-year maximum". P. Harrell warned that 
sanctions could have the opposite effect: "allies 
and major global companies will begin to 
develop an alternative to the existing financial 
and trade channels that today provide global 
weight to US sanctions". 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
It should be emphasized that the Western 
sanctions policy towards Russia has a number of 
features. 
 
First, the sanctions are truly complex and 
systemic, covering a wide range of relations 
between Russia and the "collective West" 
(sanctions during the cold war had not got such 
characteristics). These are economic sanctions, 
including trade, financial and personal sanctions 
against individuals (representatives of big 
business, politicians and government officials), 
sectoral sanctions, as well as sanctions against 
specific companies in the real sector of the 
economy, some large Russian banks and other 
financial institutions. 
 
Secondly, these sanctions are introduced in 
stages, "cumulative", and their abolition is due to 
political requirements that are not acceptable for 
the Russian Federation. This means that the 
sanctions policy will continue in the short and 
medium term. There is a need for appropriate 
consideration of its impact, and the 
corresponding correction of the strategic 
objectives of the Russian foreign economic, 
structural, regulatory, financial, monetary policy. 
 
Thirdly, the sanctions were introduced in the era 
of globalization, when the economy, financial 
and monetary spheres of the Russian Federation 
are deeply integrated into the system of world 
economic relations, including the world financial 
market and the international monetary system 
(Kramer, 1996). Based on this, it is important for 
the Russian financial and economic system to 
assess the impact of existing sanctions and 
predict the introduction of future sanctions to 
take into account their impact on various sectors 
of the economy and the financial sector. 
 
High regional unpredictability and instability 
proved to be serious limitations of Moscow's 
integration efforts in the CIS. One of the most 
important problems for the official Kremlin is the 
development of interaction with other external 
actors and the institutional structures they create. 
This requires increased investment in integration 
projects in order to preserve and develop key 
elements of influence in Central Asia. At the 
same time, the nature of the effectiveness of 
international investment and financial activities 
is changing. In the future the global and regional 
investors who place a priority not on the 
speculative-financial activities in integrated 
markets and to improve the real effectiveness of 
international cooperated production and level of 
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intergovernmental and corporate governance will 
win. Various scientific studies about that the 
development of economic integration of the 
EAEU member states is an important additional 
factor of economic growth and it creates 
significant additional opportunities to overcome 
the current fuel and raw materials orientation of 
the economy. 
 
As a result, from the point of view of national 
interests, the state priorities of strengthening 
integration in the post-Soviet states in various 
fields, strengthening mutual understanding with 
near and far neighbors, partnership with key 
states of the West and the East, the search for 
like-minded people in the South, preventing the 
destabilization of the system of international 
relations, preventing Russia from being drawn 
into military-political conflicts are vital. 
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